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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper proposes a theory of the good life for use in answering the question how much 
money the rich should spend on fighting poverty. The paper moves from the abstract to the 
concrete. To begin with, it investigates various ways to get an answer to the question what is 
good, and finds itself drawn to objective theories of the good. It then develops, taking 
Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum as its guides, a broad outline of a theory of the 
good. It holds that something evil happens to people if they do not have a real choice from a 
reasonable number of projects that realize most of their key capacities to a certain degree, 
and in connection to this it points to the great importance of money. The paper goes on 
specifically to consider what criticisms of Nussbaum's version of the capability approach are 
implied in this outline of a theory of the good. Next, it gets more specific and asks how much 
money the rich can give -and how they can be restricted in spending their money- without 
suffering any evil. It does three suggestions: the tithe suggestion, the ecological (or footprint) 
suggestion, and the fair trade suggestion. To conclude, the paper returns to the question how 
much money the rich should spend on fighting poverty.    
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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Ce papier propose une théorie de la vie bonne en vue de répondre à la question combien 
d’argent les riches doivent-ils consacrer à la lutte contre la pauvreté. Le papier débute de 
manière abstraite pour finir sur des aspects concrets. Il commence par une investigation de la 
question qu’est ce qu’une vie bonne, s’articule autour des théories objectives du bien. Il 
développe alors, à partir de Bernard Williams et Martha Nussbaum, un large contour de la 
théorie du bien. Il soutient que quelque chose de mauvais arrive aux personnes si elles n’ont 
pas un choix réel entre un nombre raisonnable de projets qui réalisent jusqu’à un certain 
degré la plupart de leurs capacités essentielles. En connexion avec ceci, il souligne la grande 
importance de la monnaie. Le papier examine les critiques de la version des capabilités 
proposée par Nussbaum qu’une telle théorie implique. Ensuite, il s’oriente de manière plus 
spécifique sur la question combien les riches doivent-ils donner-et comment ils peuvent être 
restreints concernant leurs dépenses- sans souffrir d’aucun mal. Il fait trois suggestions : la 
suggestion du dixième, la suggestion écologique (ou de l’empreinte écologique), et celle du 
commerce équitable. Pour conclure, le papier revient sur la question combien les riches 
doivent-ils consacrer à la lutte contre la pauvreté.       
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Every rich person is confronted with the question how much of his money he should devote 
to fighting poverty. This paper wants to contribute to answering this question, which we shall 
call the “money question”. Those who focus their research on this question are often decried 
for neglecting structural issues, for being shallow, or for trying to put philosophy to practical 
uses for which it is not fit. Even so, the question is a real and a deep one. At an “existential” 
level, we can even say that it is -- along with such questions as how much time we should 
devote to fighting poverty, and how world poverty problems should influence our vote and 
our consumer behavior -- one of the first ethical questions about poverty that each of us rich 
people must answer. By "rich people" I mean people (such as probably ourselves) who have 
middle class lives; the rich are those who earn middle class incomes and have middle class 
wealth, or more. Or, to use an image: the rich are those who live in middle class apartments 
or in mansions. By "poor people" I mean people whose lives are precarious and very far 
removed middle class lives, people who have much less than middle class incomes and 
middle class wealth. Poor are, for example, those people who live in urban slums.1 
 
The most important thing that we need in order to answer the "money question" --and also to 
explain why rich people are concerned with fighting poverty in the first place-- is a 
(sufficiently developed) theory of right action. That is, we need a theory of what we should, 
morally speaking, do. However, this paper will not try to defend such a theory; I do that 
elsewhere.2 The present paper focuses on developing a broad theory of the good. The 
relevance of such a theory for answering the money question is twofold. First, a theory of the 
good can make very abstract answers to the money question more concrete. One can get such 
abstract answers from theories of the right -- for example, from a theory of the right that is in 
important respects consequentialist. Such a theory of the right (a famous example of which is 
Peter Singer's3) says that you should morally do what produces the best results. This 
statement needs to be made more concrete if we are to have a meaningful answer to the 
money question, and a theory of the good can help us to do so. The second way in which a 
theory of the good can be relevant for answering the money question is that such a theory 
can help to make the point that giving away certain amounts of money does not, for the 
giver, amount to anything bad, and similarly that heeding certain restrictions in spending 
money does not, for the spender, amount to anything bad. This point may, in combination 
with a number of theories of the right, not only consequentialist ones, lead to powerful 
conclusions about how much money we should give away.  
 
The paper moves from the abstract to the concrete. Section 2 makes some very abstract 
points about the way in which a theory of the good should be defended. In Section 3, I 
                                            
1 These are only rough descriptions, but for our purposes they will do. For as we will see, the things 
most urgently needed for answering the money question are a theory of right action, and a theory of 
the good.  
2 Cf., e.g., my “On Letting Evils Persist without Good Reason.” Paper presented to the Dundee 
Conference on Demandingness, Dundee, Scotland, 2006.  
3 See Singer (1972), (1993). 
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propose the broad outlines of a theory of the good. In doing so, I take Bernard Williams and 
Martha Nussbaum as my guides. I will also specifically consider what criticisms of 
Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach are implied in the theory of the good that I 
propose. Section 4 develops some suggestions to the effect that certain degrees of monetary 
largesse do not involve anything bad for the giver at all, and that observing certain 
restrictions in spending money is not bad for the spender at all. Section 5, finally, returns to 
the question how much of their money the rich should devote to fighting poverty.   
 
2 HOW TO DEFEND A THEORY OF THE GOOD  
 
When thinking about how much money we rich people should devote to fighting poverty, we 
might think, as consequentialists do, that we should (rather than, for example, 
unconditionally give our money away) put our money where it does most good. But how do 
we decide what is good?  
 
Before exploring this question a couple of terminological stipulations are in order. Firstly, by 
a “theory of the good” we mean a theory that answers the question what is necessary and 
sufficient for having a “good life” (the answer may be different for different people). And, 
we say that people have a “bad life” when not all the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their having a good life are fulfilled. Next, something that is among the necessary conditions 
for (some people's) good lives is “a good”, or “something that is good”.4 And finally, “an 
evil” is an element of a person's situation that needs to be changed in order for him to have 
fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a good life. Thus, in our 
nomenclature, an evil is the absence of a good.5 
 
Let us now ask how we can decide what is good. Borrowing freely from the literature we 
may distinguish four answers to this question.6 The first answer is: good is what the people 
                                            
4 Goods come in roughly two sorts: goods that are preconditions for a good life and goods that are 
constituents of it. The distinction is not always sharp in practice and for our purposes it need not be 
stressed. 
5 Of course in our nomenclature many different things count as good, and as evil; and not all 
are equally great and comprehensive goods, or evils. (The most comprehensive good is to 
have all that is necessary and sufficient for having a good life; and then there are many less 
comprehensive goods). For combination with some theories of the right, it will be important 
for a theory of the good to spell out exactly which goods are how great. However, the 
present paper can only offer the broad outlines of a theory of the good. 
6 Acknowledging that the literature does not always use the exact same approaches, and that where it 
does, it often uses them for a purpose different from constructing a theory of the good, we can say that 
the first approach is favored by many (welfare) economists and has important affinities with many 
versions of utilitarianism; that Sen, among others, has much sympathy for the second approach (e.g. 
Sen, 1999); that the third approach is favored by, for example Nussbaum (e.g., 2000); and that the 
fourth approach is found with Kant as well as with, for example, Gewirth (e.g., 2003) and, to some 
extent, with Williams (e.g., 1981) and Cullity (2004). 
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think is good. So, assuming I am a consequentialist,7 if Mr. A tells me that he suffers greatly 
from the absence of potable water and Mrs. B tells me that she suffers very greatly from the 
absence of bread, I should spend my money on providing Mrs. B with bread (if I cannot help 
Mr. A and Mrs. B out).  
 
The second answer says that I should abide by the outcome of a participatory process. So 
suppose that, as a consequentialist, I am going to spend my money on helping a group that is 
clearly worse off than I myself am, and that I am unsure whether to spend my money on 
providing them with sewerage or on providing them with elementary education (and that I 
cannot do both). The beneficiaries have made it very clear (in a voting procedure, say) that 
they prefer to have elementary education. Then that is what I should spend my money on.  
 
The third approach sees things differently. It says that I should form a conception of what is 
good that is ultimately founded on my relevant considered intuitions, and that if (being a 
consequentialist) I deeply feel that sewerage is much more important than elementary 
education, I should put my money on the sewerage rather than on the elementary education.  
 
Lastly, the fourth way of deciding what is good I dub “transcendental”. This way of deciding 
tries to pull itself out of the swamp by its own hairs. It starts by making some relatively or 
absolutely uncontroversial observations about human beings (such as, that they are agents, 
rational, or have no reason to go on if their life has no substance) and then asks what must be 
the case for people to, say, be able to act, to reason, or to pursue what gives point to their 
lives. If it is to lead to a theory of the good it should then proceed more or less as follows: it 
is a good for human beings to be (able to behave as) an agent, and therefore it is also a good 
for them to have what is necessary for them to have in order to be an agent.  
    
How should we evaluate these ways of deciding what is good? My aim is only briefly to 
indicate some reasons for going with one approach rather than another. The first way of 
deciding what is good that I have mentioned runs into serious difficulties, such as problems 
of expensive tastes and of adaptive preferences. These problems are well known and need 
not be elaborated on here. The problems are so serious that they seem to disqualify this 
approach.  
 
It is more difficult with regard to the second approach. For one, where should I put my 
money when there is a conflict between my relevant considered intuitions about where to put 
it (the third approach) on the one hand, and the outcome of a participatory process (the 
second approach) on the other? Offhand, it seems hard to choose the outcome of the 
participatory process over my relevant considered intuitions here: for these intuitions give 
me reasons to think that the outcome of the process has got it wrong. But let us consider 
some objections. Firstly, someone may object that the participatory process offers reasons or 
arguments too, and these say that I, the rich person, have got it wrong. The problem is, 
however, that I am the one who is deciding what I am going to do, and that in my view the 
arguments that prevail in the participatory process are weaker. So how can I give precedence 
                                            
7 I make this assumption here -and in what follows immediately- only because it enables me to give 
definite examples of what I should do.  
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to the weaker arguments? Second, might not my own intuitions tell me that the outcome of 
the participatory process is the best indicator of what is good and that I should therefore (at 
least if I am a consequentialist) respect it, whatever it is? The problem with this suggestion is 
that it does not always seem correct. True, sometimes it does seem correct, and then it should 
be taken seriously. For instance, if I have no idea whether it is better for people to have 
elementary education or sewerage, it might be best, in my judgment, to abide by their own 
decision. However, always to follow the mentioned suggestion would very likely take us 
back to such problems as those of expensive tastes and adaptive preferences. The third 
objection says that even if I have arguments to think that what is best for people differs from 
what they themselves think is best for them, it is still better for them to have the worse thing 
they choose to have than to have imposed on them the things that I think are better for them. 
This we may call a “Lockean suggestion” because of its similarity to what Locke has said 
about tolerance.8 I think that, for many -but not for all- goods, this suggestion gets it right 
when the choice is indeed between being positively coerced (without having any decent 
alternative) to have A versus having B in a non-coerced way. In such cases, it may be better 
to have B even if without the difference in coercion it would be better to have A. However, 
even if the “Lockean suggestion” is right, it makes only a limited case for the second 
approach. For the idea that it usually very bad to be coerced is compatible with the idea 
(which is a sensible one) that it is not usually a bad thing to have a limited number of 
meaningful options to choose from which may not include all the options that you would like 
to have. 
 
I don't see similarly great problems with the third approach. It tells us to decide what is good 
by relying on our relevant, critically scrutinized intuitions (or, as Rawls would put it, on our 
considered judgments). Suppose that we have convinced ourselves that a certain set of 
intuitions about the good is both intuitively plausible and consistent with other plausible 
intuitions, and that it also has plausible implications and presuppositions. Suppose, further, 
that this set of intuitions can, if need be, be supported by arguments that go 'one step deeper'. 
In this case we may declare these intuitions about the good to be acceptable.9 
 
However, one may well have problems with an appeal to relevant considered intuitions, 
because intuitions do not offer much in the way of argument. Instead of arguing, it seems 
that someone who appeals to intuitions simply asserts that he is right, and that those who 
disagree with him see things wrongly.  
 
Bernard Williams makes a remark that can be seen as an elaboration on this point.10 He says 
that whenever people's real interests are taken to be different from what they themselves take 
their interests to be, we should be on our guard. In order for subjectively unaccepted interests 
                                            
8 Cf. also Dworkin (2000, Ch. 6) on constitutive and additive goods. 
9 Favoring this third approach is compatible with allowing for certain roles for the outcome of 
participation, e.g. epistemic and practical roles (cf. Nussbaum, 2000): the roles of telling us that we 
may be on the right track to finding truth, and that we may be on the way to finding a practically 
viable solution. 
10 See Williams, 1985, Ch. 3, esp. pp. 42-43 
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to be called “real” it does not even suffice, he says, for them later to become accepted by the 
people in question themselves; we must at the very least have an independent account of how 
it is that people were once mistaken about their real interests, and that now they no longer 
are; and we must have an account of why some people are mistaken about their real interests, 
while others aren't. In Williams’s words, what we need is a theory of error.  
 
Such a theory of error is an extremely good idea. Yet at the same time thinking about a 
theory of error may show the ineluctability of the third approach. For how do we know 
whether a theory of error is an acceptable one? Again, the best answer may be that it matches 
our considered relevant intuitions. Even if an appeal to intuition may in some respects be 
unsatisfactory, it is hard to do better without it. 
 
That gets us, fourthly, to transcendental ways of justification. These may, I believe, be part 
of a more extensive set of justifications such as just outlined (under the third point). It is very 
attractive to appeal to a relatively uncontroversial thing (often a good) and to derive from 
this thing that some things must be good, because their being good is a precondition for that 
uncontroversial thing's being the case. For example, it is very plausible that if we see human 
agency as a good, we must see whatever is a precondition for human agency as a good too; 
or that, if we see it as a good to have a life worth living, then we must see it as a good to 
have the things without which we would have no reason to go on living. However, the 
problem with these arguments often is that they claim that only goods won in a 
transcendental way are goods, or at the very least that the goods whose goodness is 
established in a transcendental way are the greatest goods. This claim is frequently left 
implicit, and it may often be very hard to substantiate it. 
 
Therefore the third approach, rather than the stricter transcendental approach, is the one I 
want to go with. Since the kind of justification of the good that I favor has strong affinity 
with “objective list” theories, I will call the theory of the good that I will defend an 
“objective” theory. One prominent worry about such a theory, however, is whether it could 
gain wide social acceptance. In the context of the present paper, the main answer to this 
worry can be this: a theory of the good used for deciding how much money I should, as a 
rich person, spend on fighting poverty, has fundamentally different concerns than a theory 
that aims at formulating minimum standards of justice or of quality of life in the context of 
policy making.11 For the latter kind of theory the need for wide acceptability and hence for 
something like a politically liberal spirit seems much clearer than for the former.  
 
3 A BROAD OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF THE GOOD 
 
We now turn to the defense of a more concrete outline of a theory of the good. I take three 
main steps to arrive at the theory of the good that I favor. Each new step corrects the earlier 
steps, and avoids certain problems of these earlier steps. Accordingly, the theory that we end 
                                            
11 It is with concerns close to these that many theorists, most famously Rawls (1993), have stressed 
the need for a widely acceptable theory. See also, e.g., Nussbaum (2000). 
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up with avoids a number of problems that alternative theories do not avoid. At the end, we 
have what I believe to be a relatively strong theory of the good. 
 
Our main guides on the journey will be Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum. We start 
with Williams (in the first step). For with him we find a suggestion that is very influential 
across much of the contemporary liberal literature, and in some sense among the “moderns” 
in general.12 However, there are some problems with this suggestion, and I shall (in the 
second step) try to show that Nussbaum can help us remedy them. Nussbaum's theory, in 
turn, owes much to Aristotle and in some sense to the “ancients” in general. However, it 
turns out (in the third step) that we will also have to go beyond the synthesis of Williams and 
Nussbaum (which we arrived at in the second step).13 
 
First step. Williams states that “a man may have ... a ground project or a set of projects 
which are closely related to his existence and which to a significant degree give meaning to 
his life.”14 The significance of such project(s) is according to him very deep indeed: “Most 
people have categorical desires, which do not depend on the assumption of the person’s 
existence, since they serve to prevent that assumption’s being questioned, or to answer the 
question if it is raised. Thus one’s pattern of interests, desires and projects not only provide 
the reason for an interest in what happens within the horizon of one’s future, but also 
constitute the conditions of there being such a future at all.”15 Williams singles “deep 
attachments to other persons” out for special mention and says that they “compel [a man’s] 
                                            
12 Authors who make suggestions similar to Williams's are, for example, Rawls (e.g., 1971), 
Nagel (e.g., 1986, 1991), and also Scheffler (e.g., 2001, 2003), and Cullity (2004). 
   But Williams also criticizes Rawls and Nagel. He maintains that, speaking of projects and 
the like, these authors conceive of life as a rectangle to be filled in (Williams, 1981, p. 12). 
Williams, by contrast, wants to emphasize that my having ground projects determines 
whether I shall go on living at all. I think we can share this Williamsian emphasis if it is only 
meant to point out that the presence or absence of ground projects is something that is good 
or bad for me in a particularly deep sense of the word. However, in Williams it may well 
mean more than that. But I shall leave this complication to one side. 
13 It bears stressing that Williams might well have had some problems with our project of 
looking for a theory of the good. He makes it plain that we don't have a clear answer to the 
question how an individual should live (at most to the question whether society should go 
on). (See Williams 1985, Ch. 3, esp. p. 48.) And, as I have already said, he also has certain 
reservations about using what I have called an “objective” theory of the good. Even so, I 
think a suggestion of his is a very good starting point for formulating an objective theory of 
the good. It might have been taken from others, but Williams's version serves our purposes 
well. As for Nussbaum, I think that I stay a bit closer to what she herself wants to do. (For the 
contrast between Nussbaum and Williams see Nussbaum 2003). And also, it might be quite 
clear why I choose her, being perhaps the most influential neo-Aristotelian, to present some 
neo-Aristotelian corrections to “Williams's suggestion.” 
14 Williams, 1981, p. 12 (emphasis in original). 
15 Ibid., p. 11.  
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allegiance to life itself”.16  This special attention for relationships seems entirely justified: 
often, they are perhaps the most important part of someone’s ground project(s).17 
 
In line with these remarks, one can at the very least make the following suggestion: it is good 
for people to be engaged in (ground) projects and (personal) relationships to which they are 
(deeply) committed. 
    
Elaborating on this, we must ask a question that goes beyond Williams: should we say that it 
is a good thing for people actually to be engaged in ground projects to which they are 
committed or (also?) that it is a good thing for people to have (meaningful) opportunities to 
be engaged in these projects? This may be a hard question to decide in the abstract. But if we 
are looking at what we should do to make the world a better place (more specifically, how 
much money we rich people should spend on fighting poverty), it seems that the good we are 
aiming at is people actually engaging in projects they are committed to – like having a 
family, writing literature, being active for an NGO, or playing the piano. But certainly we 
shouldn’t be forcing people to participate in good things, because usually being forced to 
engage in better things is worse than engaging freely in worse things. Therefore we should 
focus on providing people with opportunities rather than getting them to actually engage in 
certain projects.18 
 
This does not, however, do away with all complications, because certainly there are a 
number of things which it is better to have while being forced than to do without freely; and, 
we could ask whether the focus on providing opportunities is entirely justified, since one 
might wonder whether we should not, if the really good thing is for people actually to be 
engaging in ground projects that are their point for living, concentrate on providing those 
opportunities that we know will be taken advantage of. I think both objections are real and 
that a number of others could be added. Yet if one has a preference for something like an 
objective list theory (see above), there is a great risk of making things worse by imposing on 
people what is not fit for them. This is a good reason for generally preferring a focus on 
opportunities rather than realization.  
 
The attractiveness of “Williams’s suggestion” is threefold. Firstly, it is a unifying suggestion: 
it is far too weak to call engaging in ground projects and personal relationships to which one 
is deeply committed a good, for this good seems to embrace all or at least very many of the 
most important things that are worthwhile for human beings.19 Secondly, although it is 
unifying it is not oppressive: it leaves room to incorporate both adherence to a religious 
tradition, maintaining strong ties with one's family, and more individualistic ideals such as 
                                            
16 Ibid., p. 18. 
17 Williams does not give a definition of what a project is. One definition might be: a project is a 
coherent set of relatively concrete undertakings. 
18 Further clarification of the concept of “opportunity” --of which I will use the singular and the plural 
indiscriminately-- will be given shortly (in the present section, at the “second step”). 
19 Some authors more explicitly mention enjoyment and achievement as things that are worthwhile 
(e.g., Griffin 1985, Scanlon 1998, Cullity 2004). I would say that these are, in important ways, 
essential parts of what it is to engage in ground projects and relationships. Once one sees this, it is 
doubtful whether they should be added separately. 
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pursuing one's childhood dream of traveling around the world. Thirdly, the suggestion's 
capacity to unify (nearly) all of the most important good things without being oppressive 
may arouse the suspicion that the suggestion is empty and incapable of saying anything 
substantial about the good life. This suspicion is unfounded, however. We may say that 
thinking about the good as people's engaging in projects and relationships that they are 
committed to -or rather, as their opportunities to do this- is a colorful one: it evokes pictures 
of people dining together, engaging in the life of the local community, going fishing, 
collecting old-timers, undertaking a journey through South-East Asia, and so on. I take the 
suggestion's colorfulness to mean that it does real work in having us imagine what the 
(necessary and sufficient conditions for) a good life may look like.  
 
But then it may look as if we have returned to a subjective approach of the good: good is 
what people endorse as good. I do not think, however, that this suspicion is ultimately 
justified. It is true that we have allowed the possibility for each and every project and 
relationship that people endorse to count as good (although we'll shortly come back to that). 
But thinking of the good in terms of projects and relationships at all is itself objective, and it 
provides a general and unoppressive framework for thinking about the good life that is -as 
just said- not empty but prone to elicit concrete stories and pictures.  
 
Second step. In short, the idea is that the main good for people is to have the opportunity to 
engage in projects and relationships that are central to their lives. I have explained why this 
suggestion is attractive, but it also has its problems. The main problem seems to me to be 
this: if we look at the matter in this way, aren't there way too many goods -and consequently 
evils- in the world? If it is a good that you can engage in projects that are central to your life, 
then it seems to be a good if you can collect expensive cars or become a movie star or a star 
athlete, provided that such pursuits are central to your life. It would then be an evil if you 
cannot do these things. Consequently, we are back to problems of expensive tastes -- even 
though our theory of the good has, as we have emphasized, important non-subjective 
components.20 We could say that what we have here is “overcrowding” of evils. And this is a 
problem mainly because such overcrowding necessarily goes with what we may call 
“outcrowding” of serious evils: they tend to get watered down among the multitude of evils 
which we recognize. (When combined with a consequentialist theory of the right, a theory of 
the good that allows in very many goods may lead to the conclusion that we should let some 
people starve to help others collect old-timers.) If a theory of the good is to be plausible, it 
must concentrate on the absence of “abysses”. To do this, we need to make more definite our 
objective broad theory of the good, which says that the main good is for people to have the 
opportunity to engage in projects and relationships that are of central importance to them.  
 
                                            
20 We are also back to problems of adaptive preferences in the sense that we could imagine people 
being committed only to projects and relationships that seem to leave them in many ways very badly 
off. This may be the case, for example, with many followers of religious sects, and with many poor 
people -- and it also the case in the Kosinski example that is used below. Our final proposal remedies 
this problem as well as the “outcrowding” problem. 
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To amend Williams's suggestion Nussbaum's (neo-Aristotelian) approach, which focuses on 
people's capacities, can be of great help. I focus on Nussbaum's late work here.21 There she 
states that it must be a universal political goal for people to have real freedoms to develop 
and exercise at least a threshold level of a number of central capacities. She names ten such 
freedoms, among which: “Life: [having the real freedom to] live to the end of a human life 
of normal length [...]; emotions: [having the real freedom to] have attachments to things and 
people outside ourselves [...]; practical reason: [having the real freedom to] form a 
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life 
[...]; affiliation: A [having the real freedom to] live with and towards others [...]; B [having 
the real freedom to have] the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation.”22 These real 
freedoms are freedoms for human beings to do or to be certain things; they are real freedoms 
to develop and/or exercise certain capacities that they have. Having real freedom to develop 
or exercise certain capacities means that one can develop or exercise these capacities if one 
wants to. In order for a person to have real freedom in this sense, certain internal states of 
readiness on the part of the person are prerequisites, according to Nussbaum (for example, 
for a person to be really free, the mental preconditions for making choices must be fulfilled 
with him).23 Also, for a person really to be free to develop or exercise certain capacities, 
there must be certain arrangements in place in his environment.24 In other words, real 
freedoms have certain internal and certain external preconditions.25 Finally, to add to this a 
remark about terminology: if someone has a “real freedom” to develop or exercise certain 
capacities, I shall also say that he has a “real opportunity”, or a “real choice”, to develop or 
exercise them.  
 
Nussbaum's suggestions for political universals can be of use for developing a general theory 
of the good. When we try to combine Nussbaum's approach with Williams's suggestion we 
get something like the following: it is an evil if you don't have real opportunities (real 
freedom) to pursue projects -among which, prominently, relationships- in which most of 
your central capacities are developed to a minimum degree.26 For example, if someone 
should only have the real opportunity to live as Chance in Kosinski's “Being There” did, that 
is, to live a life of TV-watching and gardening only, then this would be an evil -- assuming at 
least that this life doesn't give one the real opportunity to develop such central capacities as 
one's intellectual, social and emotional capacities to a certain threshold level. Note that when 
                                            
21 Esp. Nussbaum (2000); see also, e.g., Nussbaum (1998) and Nussbaum (2005). 
22 Nussbaum (2000), pp. 78-79. Nussbaum calls these central real freedoms to develop and exercise 
certain capacities: “capabilities”. Thus a capability is not a “capacity” but a “real freedom”. 
23 Cf. Nussbaum, 2000, p. 84 
24 See Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 84-85 
25 Thus if one is to have real freedom to develop certain capacities, the development can't start from 
zero. Therefore it might be more accurate to speak of "further developing" certain capacities than of 
"developing" them. However, I shall for simplicity continue to speak of "developing" capacities. 
Furthermore, often when I speak of "developing" certain capacities this should be read as "developing 
and exercising" them. 
26 Nussbaum thinks that there should be real freedom to develop each and every of the central 
capacities to a threshold level. Alkire (2002) thinks that the real freedom to develop most might be 
enough. I tend to go with Alkire here -- where the interpretation of “most” should be neither too strict 
nor too lenient.  
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our aim is to develop a theory of the good, we can to some extent take into account -indeed 
we should take into account- that it can differ from person to person what these key 
capacities are; when we want political universals, these interpersonal differences may be 
harder to take into account.27 
 
If we should adopt the suggestion that there is only an evil for people as long as they don't 
have the real opportunity to pursue projects that develop most of their central capacities to a 
certain threshold level, we seem to have arrived at a much more specific objective theory of 
the good, and one that certainly avoids overcrowding of evils.28  
 
Third step. But now, unless we make two additions, there is a risk of what we may (by a 
neologism) call “undercrowding” of evils. I shall give two reasons for this risk and two 
additions that can help us get around it. 
 
Firstly. Presumably, when we say that it is an evil if someone doesn't have the real 
opportunity to pursue projects that develop most of his key capacities to a certain threshold 
level, we do not mean that all different ways to develop these capacities should be open to 
him. To think that they should be is highly implausible a position (and at any rate it would 
make for over- rather than undercrowding by evils). But what is it, then, that we mean? 
Nussbaum speaks of multiple realizability of central capabilities (real freedoms): “[E]ach of 
the different capabilities may be concretely realized in a variety of different ways, in 
accordance with individual tastes, local circumstances, and traditions.”29 I fear that this may 
be read -though Nussbaum will no doubt distance herself from this reading- as saying that as 
long as there is available, in every culture, a certain more concrete way to realize a certain 
more abstract capacity, we can be satisfied. But certainly this result would be oppressive: if 
we do not, in each culture, have available a reasonable number of more concrete ways to 
realize a certain more general central capacity to a certain degree -ways, moreover, that fit 
us- talk of real freedom will sound hollow.30  
 
One might say that this is an “operationalization” issue, an issue that has to do with the 
provision more concrete ways to realize more general capacities. That could be correct, but 
if the thought were that the issue is unimportant, I would not agree. To stress its importance 
I'd like to refer to it as the “redoubling of freedom”: in order for there not to be an evil, you 
must have a real choice from a reasonable number of different projects that fit you and 
through which you can develop most of your key capacities to a certain threshold level. (This 
of course is entirely compatible with -indeed it implies- the idea that you should not be 
positively coerced to carry out one of those different projects.31) To my mind, Nussbaum 
                                            
27 However, as we shall see below, a theory of the good too can only take them into account to a 
limited extent. 
28 That is, if we don’t have too wild ideas about what can count as a central capacity. 
29 Nussbaum, 2000, p. 105 (cf. also p. 77).  
30 It is not similarly true that a social setting is oppressive unless it gives you the maximum choice you 
could possibly have -- in particular, unless it gives you a choice from as many projects that fit you as 
possible. Cf. e.g. Williams (1987), G. Dworkin (1989), Sen (1992). 
31 By positive coercion I mean coercion not by a logical lack of options (as in “you must either be an 
atheist, an agnostic or a theist”) nor by an empirical lack of options (as in “you can choose either to be 
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doesn't bring out the need to redouble freedom in the way just mentioned sufficiently clearly. 
It is true that Nussbaum's emphasis on practical reason may go in the same direction. But it 
does so only indirectly and non-explicitly. 
 
"Redoubling freedom'' thus helps us to get at a theory of the good that does not fall victim to 
"undercrowding'' of evils (i.e., to admitting too few things as evils). But there is still another 
reason why our theory of the good risks "undercrowding" of evils. I now turn to this second 
reason. We have said that, in a theory of the good, the focus should be on giving people a 
real choice from a reasonable number of projects that fit them and through which they can 
develop most of their central capacities to a certain threshold level. However, in this 
formulation the clause “that fit them” might cause problems. For even in a broad theory of 
the good that is for non-political use, we will necessarily evaluate the world in relatively 
general terms. Let's take a summer camp as an example. We will say that there are no evils 
for anyone as regards his real opportunities to realize his essential creative capacities as long 
as there is a real choice from a reasonable number of projects that focus on creative pursuits, 
such as playing the guitar, reading books, and playing soccer. Certainly in this way we get 
fair enough an evaluation of how good this social setting is, but at the same time the 
evaluation is somewhat crude. It is very much imaginable that for a certain someone the only 
way sufficiently to develop his emotional and creative skills is to play the piano - not the 
guitar, the fagot, or the organ, but the piano (as, recently, for the mystery piano man32); and 
to play on it not jazz, nor Romantic or contemporary music, but Bach and Bach alone. I think 
this example points to an inevitable crudeness of any theory of the good, and especially of 
any theory of the good focusing on giving real opportunities to pursue a reasonable number 
of capacity-realizing projects: it can never do full justice to the differences between 
individuals.33 
 
There is no solution for this problem, I think (except trying to be ever more fine-grained), 
but as far as I am concerned the problem points to the special importance of providing 
people with means that are as generic as possible, such as money.34 In our summer camp 
example, if the piano man had been given some money he might have taken the bus to town, 
found a piano somewhere, and go play his favorite music. Although this argument for 
bringing in money is neither very precise as to the amount of money that people should have 
nor purports to present money as a panacea, it does make a clear case for the importance of 
money. 
 
                                                                                                                           
a carpenter or a blacksmith”); rather, we have a case of positive coercion in situations where I should 
either do X or else am made to face grave consequences. 
32 The Guardian of May 16, 2005 featured an article entitled “Do you know this man? Mystery of the 
silent, talented piano player who lives for his music. His rendition of Swan Lake only clue to identity 
of stranger found soaked by the sea.” This fascinating story was later revealed as a scam. 
33 We may, paradoxically, say that every theory is always to some extent second-best. The clause “that 
fits them” points not to people's own desires but to the fact that people are different and consequently 
that the opportunities they should have in order to be able to realize their key capacities up to a certain 
level won't be the same for all of them. 
34 Obviously, money is only (relatively) generic as long as there is an institutional context in which it 
functions relatively well.  
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Furthermore, this argument is different from another argument that, let me emphasize it, is 
presupposed throughout this entire paper. This argument is that if it is good to have a certain 
thing, it is also good to have all (necessary and sufficient) preconditions for having that 
good. Among these preconditions, money is frequently prominent.35  
 
To summarize: There is an evil for someone only if he does not have 1) a real choice from a 
reasonable number of projects through which he can realize most of his central capacities to 
some threshold level, as well as 2) a reasonable amount of money. It is true that, for some 
people, neither having real choice from a number of apparently acceptable projects nor some 
amount of money will actually give them real opportunities for realizing most of their key 
capacities to some degree. To stay with our earlier example: the piano man may have money 
and take a bus to town but there may turn out to be no public pianos in town. But for most 
people we can say that if they have the two things just mentioned, they will have such 
opportunities and there will be no evil for them. 
 
The arguments for this broad theory of the good are:  that it is -as Williams's sketch was- an 
unoppressive, unifying theory,36 capable of evoking concrete images; and that it avoids 
problems of over- as well as of undercrowding of evils. In connection to this last point, we 
may observe the following advantage of our account: With Williams's suggestion we were 
not in a position to criticize any projects and relationships; now we are. Those constellations 
of projects and relationships are liable to criticism that do not give people real freedom to 
pursue a number of concrete ways to develop most of their central capacities to a threshold 
level. This further advantage implies that we have admittedly moved yet a bit further away 
from Williams: we have moved further away from the idea that there is always something 
deeply unreasonable to people having to give up their ground projects;37 in a sense, our 
theory has become a bit more unforgiving, and it now says that sometimes situations which 
do not allow for certain ground projects and the like do not involve evils after all. 
 
It is useful to reiterate the main critical remarks about Nussbaum’s approach that are implied 
in the above. Firstly, we should insist that freedom ought to be redoubled: not only should 
people have real freedoms to realize capacities, they should also have a real choice from a 
sufficient number of projects that realize them. The need for such redoubling is not brought 
out well enough by Nussbaumian phrases such as “multiple realizability”. Second, providing 
real choice from a sufficient number of projects that are at first sight appropriately capacity-
realizing is for a number of people unlikely to really provide them with real opportunities to 
                                            
35 Finally, since the argument might provoke confusion, I should stress that I am not of course arguing 
for bringing money in for its own sake. If I refrain from explaining what the money is for, this is 
because the money's purpose varies among individuals and thus does not admit of any explanation in 
general terms. 
36 It is especially unifying, of course, as long as we don't specify what capacities are central. 
Frequently, it is of course necessary to specify this. One plausible way doing so would be Finnis's 
method, which Alkire (2002) advocates. 
37 Cf. Williams (1981, p. 14, p. 17). I attribute to Williams a slightly bolder position than he actually 
defends. But there should be no problem as long as we keep in mind that Williams is not saying that a 
categorical commitment must always take precedence over moral demands, but rather that he is 
stressing the aporetical character of  situations where commitments and moral demands conflict. 
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develop most of their key capacities to a threshold level. More generic means like money can 
often do more to give these people real capacity-developing opportunities. Therefore such 
means should receive due emphasis. In other words, money remains important.  
 
In addition, I have drawn attention to two further advantages of speaking in terms of projects 
and relationships. First, this way of speaking is unifying. To use it may be an antidote against 
proliferation of and balkanization of the mind by all kinds of lists and enumerations. It may 
help theories of the good to (re)capture the imagination. Second, the language of projects and 
relationships is nevertheless concrete: it focuses the attention on such things as playing the 
piano, worshipping one's God, etc.. This concreteness too may help to make reflection about 
the good captivating.  
 
Finally. The theory of the good that we have outlined can be developed further in a number 
of ways, such as by asking: what, more concretely, are the key capacities that matter, and to 
what extent should they be developed? And, if people have a real choice from certain 
projects, just how much real freedom to develop certain capacities does this give them? Etc.. 
Such questions are very important if we are to use the theory of the good developed here in 
tandem with a theory of the right. However, these questions surpass the limits of the present 
paper, which can only give a direction in which a theory of the good should go.38 On the 
other hand, however, giving a direction would be useless if we could not indicate some 
practical implications of our theory of the good. This is what we shall now do.39 
 
4 THE GOOD LIFE, GIVING AWAY MONEY, AND LIMITATIONS ON SPENDING 
MONEY 
 
In this section we are going to put the general theory of the good that we have developed to 
use, by asking when a lack of money can be seen as an evil. More precisely we shall be 
asking this question while concentrating on those who may give money: how much can they 
                                            
38 It may be wondered whether an outline of a theory that leaves certain vital things open (such as 
which are the key capacities that matter) does not run a greater risk of abuse than a very specific 
theory. My reply would be: a well worked-out theory may well be easier to apply practically, and that 
is an advantage. (Yet our theory too already admits of practical translations; see the next section.) 
Still, it is not clear whether a better worked-out theory is by that token less liable to abuse. For one, 
also a better worked-out theory would still be dependent on good-faith application, and could be 
abused by those who wished to bend it according to their purposes. For example, if (as I tend to think 
but cannot argue for in the present paper) the important human capacities are cognitive, social, 
emotional and physical capacities, a theory that stated and defended them as such could still be liable 
to abuse. Furthermore, a better worked-out theory could even be more liable to abuse than a vaguer 
one, because it lends itself more to mechanistic interpretation that neglects the "spirit" of its 
specifications. For example, arguing (as I shall do in the next section) for the statement that rich 
people should usually give away 10% of their money is risky, because such a statement easily gets a 
life of its own: people tend to forget the considerations on which it is based. 
39 As will become clear, the implications that I propose do not presuppose answers to all such 
questions as exactly which key capacities matter - they could follow for a fairly broad range of 
answers to such questions. 
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give without suffering any evil? And, what restrictions on spending money can they observe 
without suffering any evil? We will only make some suggestions, which are not the only 
ones that may follow from our general theory of the good.40 
 
First. It seems to follow from the proposed theory of the good that it is not an evil thing to 
give away money if after the giving you still have a real choice from a reasonable number of 
projects that realize most of your key capacities to a certain minimum extent, as well as a 
reasonable amount of money; and if, moreover, having all this is not seriously threatened in 
the future. My suggestion is that, since usually these conditions are clearly and amply 
fulfilled for a reasonably rich person before he gives anything away, they will at any rate 
keep being fulfilled if he has roughly the same amount of money left after he has given some 
money away.41 One can disagree as to how long this is the case, but for someone who has 
quite some money it seems to be somewhere between, say, one percent (which is in any case 
not a substantial change) and fifty percent (which is at any rate a substantial change). What is 
true for one percent is also true for two, three, or five percent, it seems: these are not, for 
people who are reasonably well-off, substantial changes. And what is true for fifty percent is 
also true for forty, thirty, and probably also for twenty-five percent. It seems, then, a good 
practical guideline that for rich (wo)men giving away about ten percent of their money does 
not involve any evil.42 This guideline we may call the tithe suggestion (at least, if we forget 
about the undertones of taxes that the word “tithe” easily evokes).43  
 
Let us briefly look at some problems of this suggestion. First, suppose that someone says that 
he already pays a lot of taxes, and that therefore he cannot, without suffering evils, give 
tithes in addition. The reply can be that the tithe suggestion is offered as an answer to the 
question how much, at least, I can make myself “worse off” in financial terms without 
suffering any evil. Now, the present objection seems to say that I have already made myself 
a lot “worse off” in such terms by deciding to pay taxes. But such a decision is not, in fact, a 
choice to make oneself worse off, because one does not, at least in a country where paying 
taxes is reasonably well enforced, really have the choice not to pay taxes.  
 
Secondly, it may seem that the above suggestion is open to an iterative interpretation.44 That 
is, if it does not involve anything bad to give away 10% of your money, why shouldn't one 
say that giving 10% of the remaining 90% doesn't involve any evil either? To reply: even if 
giving ten percent of the remaining 90% doesn’t make you worse off when you compare 
having what you’ve left with having 90%, it might make you worse off when compare 
having what you’ve left with having the original amount of money (there is a sorites paradox 
involved here).45 (In any case, we cannot say that you still have roughly the same amount of 
                                            
40 Also, I cannot of course claim that mine is the only theory of the good with which these suggestions 
are compatible. 
41 This absolutely leaves open the possibility that they keep being fulfilled if one gives away much 
more than this.  
42 These conclusions remain standing if one takes a closer look at how most rich people spend their 
money and how much they can and do save. But I will not try to show this here. 
43 Singer (1993, p. 246) makes the same suggestion, but arrives at it in a very different way. 
44 Cf. Cullity (2004, esp. Ch. 5, 6). In his discussion, Cullity is throughout concerned with right action. 
45 As said, I leave open the question whether it does in fact make you worse off. 
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money as you originally had.) And when we ask whether you’ve made yourself worse off by 
giving money, the latter comparison is the appropriate one to make. 
  
Third, what about someone saying “I've got used to (a constellation of) projects that require 
all my money; therefore to give away any of it involves evil for me.” Here, the answer 
should be that as a reasonably rich person, I have the appearances against me, because I have 
so much more than what we would generally and in good faith regard as necessary to give 
someone a real choice from a reasonable number of projects that realize most of his key 
capacities to a certain minimum extent, as well as to let him have a reasonable amount of 
money.46 Furthermore, even if we grant that in order to have a good life, I must be able to go 
on living as I now do, I cannot really make myself believe that I need all my money to do so. 
A lifestyle of a reasonably rich person grows and is tuned to certain rough amounts of 
money, not to exact amounts. The rich person who complains that he would suffer evils for 
absolutely everything he gives away, should also complain that he had too little money to 
begin with.   
  
Finally, suppose that someone claims that he needs all his money to be able to maintain his 
self-respect. It may seem possible to reply that self-respect should be a byproduct of having 
everything else that is needed to have a good life. And if so, having self-respect wouldn’t 
take any extra money at all. Sometimes, however, it does seem to be the case that even 
reasonably rich people can with good reason claim that they do need all their money or even 
more to maintain their self-respect (e.g., in societies where self-respect crucially depends, for 
the rich at least, on the ability to give gifts). The point is that the rich in contemporary 
Western societies cannot usually credibly claim to be in such a situation.  
 
Let us now consider some restrictions that could be observed when spending money and that 
do not involve any evil for the spender. I shall discuss two that seem to me promising. 
 
The first, which is connected to money in a rather indirect way, can be called the "ecological 
(or footprint) point". It is beyond doubt that if someone could only act in ways that would 
minimally damage the environment (or make for maximum “sustainability” and the like), he 
would be very seriously limited in what he could do -- to such an extent that these limitations 
would involve serious evils for him. But perhaps this is not true if he could only choose from 
actions that damaged the environment to a modest and limited degree; then, many actions 
could still be open to him, and often no evil might be involved.  
 
Can we say something more about when it involves an evil not to be able to burden the 
environment to a certain extent? Suppose that we could give the same answer to this question 
for every human being: not to be able burden the environment to at least size X involves an 
                                            
46 This is so for a number of good-faith specifications of which key capacities and which level of them 
matters. One specification might be: having a real choice from a number of educational and 
professional trajectories, and having a real choice in how to form and maintain relationships and 
leisure projects. In addition, there would of course have to be a real opportunity to have adequate 
housing and adequate health care, as well as other things that are needed if one is to be able to really 
choose from a number of fitting projects and relationships.  
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evil. Then, we could say that we lived in a sense in a tragic world if size X were bigger than 
the size of one’s ecological footprint, where the ecological footprint is defined as the 
maximum size of environmental burden that would be sustainable (make for ecological 
survival) if every human being imposed such a burden. We hope that we do not live in a 
tragic world in this sense, and thus that size X is at most the size of our ecological footprint -
- or rather, at most the size that our ecological footprint would be even if the world’s 
population were considerably larger than it is now. In other words, we hope that it does not 
involve an evil to be able maximally to burden the environment as much as the size of our 
ecological footprint.  
 
Why would our hope be real, and could we thus say that we would not suffer any evil if we 
lived within our ecological footprint, with the restrictions on spending money that this 
involves? It seems real because the development of our key capacities (such as our cognitive, 
emotional and social capacities) often does not require very many material goods. For 
example, to exercise your cognitive capacities you do need materials, such as pencils and 
paper, as well as materials involved in preconditions for your exercising your skills (such 
preconditions include your being healthy and well-fed etc.); but all this does not usually 
involve very many material goods. Therefore most people can have a real choice from a 
variety of projects that develop most of their key capacities to a certain threshold level while 
their environmental burden is at most the size of their ecological footprint.  
 
We should acknowledge, however, that our hope is not real for everyone: some people's 
personal key capacities may, at times, be such that they could only be developed to a 
threshold level through projects that guzzled material resources (although I find it hard to 
think of an example here); or some people may only be able to survive an illness by getting 
very effective but very environmentally burdening treatment; or they may hold a high public 
office that requires them to fly around the world. It is hard to deny, then, that some people do 
exist for whom it does involve evils to operate within the confines of their ecological 
footprint; but their number doesn’t seem to be overwhelmingly large.47 Yet because there are 
such people, our hope must be that for the rest of us it does not involve an evil to be able 
only to burden the planet somewhat less than the size of our ecological footprint.48  
 
I very briefly mention a second restriction that we rich people could, when spending money, 
heed without suffering any evil: the fair trade suggestion. It seems to me, but cannot argue 
for this here, that it does imply an evil always to look for (nearly) the cheapest ways to 
develop most of your key capacities to some extent. But it may involve no evil only to be 
able to choose those ways of developing your key capacities that are for (a range of) reasons 
                                            
47 It seems to me that we must be extremely wary of people who quickly claim to be among these 
people themselves. 
48 For many rich people, living within their footprint will surely involve changing their lifestyles. So 
the footprint-suggestion proposes that we can change our lives very much and still have good lives. 
The tithing suggestion, by contrast, does not involve any drastic life-changes. But then, the tithing 
suggestion is only a very minimal suggestion. On the other hand, one may think that the footprint 
suggestion may be overly optimistic. Even so, however, we must firmly hope that there is an 
arrangement that is both sustainable and makes a good life for everyone possible. 
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other than their price the impartially best ones available to you.49 For example, it may 
involve no evil only to have a choice to buy fair (trade) products instead of conventional 
products (that are by many standards less fair), as long at least as there is enough choice 
within the category of fair products, and as long as the price differences between these 
products and "conventional" products are not too extreme.   
 
Finally, I would like to add a remark about Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach, 
with which many thoughts developed in the present paper have a lot of similarities. I have 
said that many people’s central capacities can be developed and exercised to a great extent in 
relatively "immaterial" ways. If that is correct, then something that is sometimes said about 
the capability approach –and especially about Nussbaum’s version of it- is probably not true: 
it is likely to be incorrect that the capability approach is totally out of touch with a finite 
world where many goods are scarce. The capability approach may be able to deal better with 
scarcity than is sometimes assumed. If it is lofty, it often may be realizable as well. It need 
not be too good to be true.  
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Let us summarize the main concrete suggestions that we have just arrived at. For ease of 
recognition, we’ll give them some fancy names. 
1) The Tithing Suggestion. For rich people, it does not usually involve evil to give away ten 
percent of their money; 
2) The Ecological (or Footprint) Suggestion. For rich people, it mostly does not involve an 
evil to spend their money so as to avoid exceeding their ecological footprint; 
3) The Fair Trade Suggestion. For rich people, it may not involve an evil to have only the 
opportunity to buy fair trade products. 
 
It bears repeating that these are minimum suggestions; probably they do not offer an 
exhaustive account of the degrees and ways of giving money which involve no evils. And, it 
is important that the suggestions can to a great extent coexist; often, abiding by all of them at 
the same time does not involve any evil.50  
 
All this does not yet provide us with an answer to the question how much of their money rich 
people should give away to fight poverty. To arrive at such an answer, we need a theory of 
the right, that is, a theory about what we should morally do. Such a theory could, for 
example, tell us always to maximize the good. Our theory of the good may make sense in 
combination with a lot of (rather formal) theories of the right. I will briefly say something 
                                            
49 It would be more correct but more cumbersome, and less clear, to speak not of the "impartially best" 
but of the "impersonally least suboptimal" ways available to you. Here "impersonal" means: as seen 
from  "nowhere". Cf. Nagel 1986   
50 Admittedly, this suggestion deserves careful elaboration, which I cannot however give it here. 
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about this theory of the good in combination with a theory of the right with the following 
main components:51  
 
1) There is a pro-tanto moral reason to fight impersonal evils as best you can. (By 
impersonal evils I mean evils as they are -qua quality and quantity- as seen from 
'nowhere'.)52 
2) There is a pro-tanto moral reason to fight personal evils as best you can. (By 
personal evils I mean evils as they are -qua quality and quantity- as seen through a 
moral agent's own eyes and as felt through his own skin.)  
3) About the relative weight of these two moral reasons we can say: If you can fight 
a great personal evil at the cost of a small impersonal evil, you may do so; and if you 
can fight a great impersonal evil at the cost of a small personal evil, you must do so.  
 
I will not spend any time trying to defend this theory of right action here; I do that elsewhere. 
Our present concern is what answers to the money question it would give us when combined 
with the theory of the good that has been proposed above. This theory of the good holds that 
someone has a good life if he has a real choice from a reasonable number of projects that 
realize most of his key capacities to some extent. This means that if he does not have such a 
choice, he suffers a great evil;53 and if he has it, he suffers no (or in any case no significant) 
evil. Now if we combine this with the third statement of the above theory of the right, it 
follows that a person must at least fight those great impersonal evils that he can fight without 
giving up having real choice from a reasonable number of projects that realize most of his 
key capacities to some extent.54  
                                            
51 Of extant proposals, this theory may be closest to Scheffler's (1982) or to a variation of this 
position. 
52 The term pro-tanto moral reason, which is taken from Kagan (1989), denotes a real moral reason 
which can, however, be outweighed by stronger ones. The nomenclature impersonal-personal is 
inspired by Scheffler (1982) and Nagel (1986). (For what I call "impersonal" and "personal" here, 
Nagel would probably say "objective" and "subjective".) 
53 Our theory seems to suggest that there is one turning point between having real choice and not 
having it, and that by having to go beyond this point (e.g., by giving money) one suffers great evil. 
But, it may be objected, any such point will be arbitrary. However, we have the choice between saying 
that beyond a certain -inevitably somewhat arbitrary- point I suffer great evil if I go on giving dollars 
away, and saying that I suffer no great evil until the loss of an extra dollar (or dime, or cent...) is by 
itself a great evil for me (cf. Cullity 2004). The latter alternative is implausibly strict: it is intuitively 
clear that I suffer a great evil by giving away money long before one extra dollar (or dime, or cent...) 
by itself makes a difference to me. (There is a sorites paradox involved here.)  
54 One may ask: what if all the rich were willing to do at least what they could do at the no significant 
cost (in terms of evils) to themselves, and if consequently there were too many hands to fight serious 
evils (such as poverty)? (Let us not now doubt whether there could ever be too many hands; let us, for 
the sake of the argument, just assume that this could be the case.) Which rich people should exempted 
from doing their duty? It seems to me that the following would be the most plausible answer: even if 
all rich people in this case can help without suffering significant evil themselves, it may still be 
possible to distinguish between those who can help at cost (in terms of evils) to themselves that are 
"not significant" and those who can help at costs that are "absolutely not significant". It would then be 
most plausible to assign the duties to help to those who could perform them at "absolutely no 
significant" cost to themselves. 
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Now since we rich people can usually give tithes and still have a real choice from a 
reasonable number of capacity-realizing projects, and since we can do a lot of impersonal 
good by giving them,55 we must, morally, give tithes for the sake of fighting poverty or some 
similarly good cause. The same is true for living within our ecological footprint and for 
buying only fair trade products: these are courses of action that we must take, since we can 
take them and still have real choice from a fair number of capacity-realizing projects, and 
since they are bound to do great impersonal good.56  
 
It may be useful to compare the position developed in this paper with a famous different one, 
Peter Singer's. Singer simply says that you should fight impersonal evil as best you can. This 
means that you can be required to take on great evils, provided only that the price you pay by 
doing so is, impersonally seen, more than offset by the goods that others receive as a result. 
It is true that Singer also defends a principle that might generate the same conclusion as we 
have just reached. He says that "if we can prevent something bad without sacrificing 
anything of comparable [moral] significance, we ought to do it."57 This principle is so 
general as to be able both to make room for personal evils and to allow for many different 
specifications of what is bad or evil, including the one that we have proposed. It is clear, 
however, that Singer intends this principle only as a minimal and ecumenical suggestion, 
meant to speak to those who don't share his utilitarian framework. Ultimately, however, 
Singer remains a utilitarian -to be precise, a preference utilitarian-, and consequently both his 
theory of the right and his theory of the good differ considerably from those that have been 
proposed in the present paper. 
 
Finally. I have proposed a theory of the good which, in combination with certain theories of 
the right, might not let the rich get away with it easily. It may be wondered, however, 
whether this doesn’t come at a price: to the extent that we the rich can do with less money 
while nothing bad happens to us, to that extent, it seems, can the poor too do with less money 
without anything bad happening to them.  
 
   But is this really so? We have taken as our guide the idea that something bad happens to 
people when they do not have a real choice from a reasonable number of projects that enable 
them to develop most of their key capacities to some degree, and also if they do not have a 
                                            
55 To be sure, there is a lot of debate about whether our help can help. Elsewhere, I have defended that 
it can (cf. also Cullity 2004, Ch. 3). Of course, saying that help of rich individuals can do good is in 
no way to deny the importance of structural reform. Indeed, one way in which the rich individuals can 
help is by lobbying for institutional reform. 
56 This may be least clear for living within your ecological footprint. My idea is that it could really 
help the poor to do this, because living in this way could be a real and forceful inspiration for yourself 
and others to get serious about moving towards a more ideal world; if the size of your lifestyle is 
bigger than what it could justifiably be in an ideal situation, you might well –even if you speak 
differently- be quite happy to leave things as they are. 
57 Singer, 1993, p. 230 (Singer leaves out the word "moral" but inserts it in what follows immediately: 
ibid., p. 231).  
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certain amount of money. This conception of the good does imply that you do not need a 
whole lot of money. But it also implies that you do need some.58  
 
   More generally, many poor people clearly lack real freedom to engage in a reasonable 
number of capacity-realizing projects. On the conception of the good that I have sketched we 
do not, then, have a reason to condone the "multidimensional conspiracies" that many 
situations of dire poverty are: situations where people are stuck in poor housing conditions, 
violence, poor health, illiteracy, and unemployment; where they lack real opportunities to 
acquire self-esteem and to avoid that their families are uprooted, their emotions blunted, and 
that they fall victim to despair – to name only some of the things we find together in many 
shantytowns and other places of widespread poverty across the world. Nor, it should be 
recalled, does what has been said here imply that we should usually just go ahead and 
impose our own vision on others: frequently the people themselves are the best guides to 
what is best for them, and seldom is coercion justified. This is not to say that there are no 
risks in the position that has been defended here. Yet there is reason to think that if this paper 
delivers a message to the rich, it does not do so at the expense of the poor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
58 This is again true for a broad range of concretizations of the theory of the good outlined above. On 
many such concretizations, it may, if you're not very rich, involve significant evils to give tithes. And, 
if you have very little money (or more generally have very few opportunities for flourishing) sticking 
to the "ecological suggestion" may also involve significant evil. For although it is commonly easier to 
live within your ecological footprint when you are poor, it may in a context of multifold deprivation 
involve significant evil not to avail yourself of ecologically destructive opportunities when they 
present themselves. (However, I think, or at least very much hope, that in the end the poor cannot 
usually be excused here and can generally live within their footprint without anything bad happening 
to them.)   
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